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CHINA AS A “NATIONAL STRATEGIC
BUYER”: TOWARD A MULTILATERAL
REGIME FOR CROSS-BORDER M&A
Jeffrey N. Gordon* & Curtis J. Milhaupt**
Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit
international governance regime for cross-border M&A; rather,
there is a shared understanding that publicly traded
companies are generally for purchase by any bidder—domestic
or foreign—willing to offer a sufficiently large premium over a
target’s stock market price. The unspoken premise that
undergirds the system is that the prospective buyer is
motivated by private economic gain-seeking.
The entry of China into the global M&A market threatens
the fundamental assumptions of the current permissive
international regime. China has become a significant player in
the cross-border M&A market, particularly as an acquirer. The
central claim of the article is that the cross-border M&A regime
will require a new rules-of-the-game structure to take account
of China’s ascension. This is because cross-border M&A with
China introduces a new dimension: what we call the “national
strategic buyer” (“NSB”), whose objective is to further the
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interests of a nation-state in the pursuit of industrial policy or
out of national security concerns. Thus, China presents a
problem of asymmetric motives in the global M&A market:
sellers to Chinese firms have private motives for pursuing
transactions, while at least some Chinese acquirers have noneconomic motivations. Yet distinguishing commercial and
financial motives from national strategic motives in Chinese
firms is difficult.
To date, the only mechanisms for addressing the NSB
problem are national security review mechanisms such as the
CFIUS process in the United States, as recently expanded
through legislative amendment. The EU is moving forward on
a screening regulation with a similar objective that
contemplates activity both by the European Commission and
the Member States. Whether suitably tailored or not, these
approaches fail to take on the long-term concern of fully
assimilating China as a normal actor in the global economic
system.
To address the NSB problem, we propose the adoption of a
multilateral regime under which firms subject to potential
government influence in their corporate decision-making must
demonstrate their “eligibility” to engage in outbound M&A.
For covered firms, the regime would require a commitment to
exclusively commercial/financial motives in cross-border
acquisitions, made credible through a corporate governance
set-up featuring independent directors (selected by foreign
investors) who publicly verify adherence and disclose the
source of acquisition financing. Enforcement would consist of
a secretariat that can evaluate eligibility and monitor postacquisition conduct, and national legislation that would
permit rejection of an acquisition of a local target by an
acquirer that does not meet the eligibility criteria.
I.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current trade dispute with China, framed in terms of
the United States-China balance-of-trade deficit, prompts
reflection once again on the liberal global economic regime
that has been the premise for the post-World War II global
order. Economic theory makes it clear that the global welfaremaximizing trade regime would seek to lower trade barriers
to permit the pursuit of national comparative advantage in
both goods and services. National governments, however, face
ongoing political and economic pressure from local losers as
well as the consequences of local adjustment costs from the
global trade regime. Governments may thus incline toward
protectionist measures that, over time, would undo initial
commitments to an open trade regime. The ongoing
maintenance of this liberal global order, therefore, requires a
structure that creates a binding rules-of-the-game framework
to constrain national defection and a dispute resolution
procedure for settling grievances. Enter the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”).
The regime for the global movement of capital is less well
developed. The general framework has been permissive and
facilitative. At times, nations have imposed general capital
controls, either outbound—to foster in-country investment
and to reduce exchange rate deterioration—or inbound—to
avoid boom-and-bust economic cycles and to minimize
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inflation.1 A somewhat different question arises when global
capital flows take the form of a cross-border acquisition, when
an acquirer domiciled or headquartered in one country
acquires a company domiciled or headquartered in another.
As Figure 1 indicates, cross-border merger and acquisition
(“M&A”) activity is a consequential form of global economic
activity. In the post-financial-crisis recovery years (2014–
2017), the annual level of cross-border M&A activity has
exceeded $1 trillion, and the cross-border share of global M&A
activity has exceeded forty percent.2

See generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 95–111 (2011); Sebastian
Edwards, How Effective Are Capital Controls?, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 65, 65
(1999).
2 To scale this activity: Trade in merchandise exports and commercial
services was approximately $20 trillion in 2016. See WTO, WORLD TRADE
STATISTICAL REVIEW 2017, 100, 104 (2017), https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts2017_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XL5C-LSQ3].
The measures are not directly comparable, of course. Among other things,
M&A reflects irreversible (or at least long-term) commitments, whereas a
significant portion of trade reflects spot market transactions or short-term
contracts.
1

AND THE
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Figure 13

Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit
international governance regime for cross-border M&A;
rather, there is a shared understanding that publicly traded
companies are generally available for purchase to any
bidder—domestic or foreign—willing to offer a sufficiently
large premium over a target’s stock market price. This
expectation is, of course, limited by the shifting boundaries of
host-country protectionism and the prevailing patterns of
corporate ownership in different countries. But the unspoken
premise that undergirds the system is that the prospective
buyer is motivated by private economic gain-seeking. Some
buyers may be strategic, seeking economies of scale or scope,
and others may be financial, looking to maximize immediate
cash flows. These differences, which may elicit different
target- and host-country responses, are nevertheless similar
3 Deals,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters.
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
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in their overarching private objectives: Firms and
management teams are seeking to advance the economic
interests of their private owners.
One particular aspect of the implicit assumptions
supporting the cross-border M&A regime bears emphasis. It
is assumed that the state enters the picture on the target side
only, the sell side. In other words, it is assumed that the
laissez-faire system is subject to state-level decisions that a
particular target is not for sale, perhaps because (i) the followon business strategy is anticipated to cost jobs in the target’s
home country, (ii) the target provides strategic infrastructure
(like a port or public utility), or (iii) the target is important for
national security reasons. By contrast, it is assumed that the
state does not play a directive role in the acquirer’s decisionmaking, the buy side. Protectionism and other forms of
mercantilism have entered as constraints on the pecuniary
motives of target shareholders, not as industrial policy
imperatives that outweigh the pecuniary motives of the
acquirers.4 The relatively bounded nature of state action has
meant that the permissive international cross-border M&A
regime could survive and even thrive without the law-making
and enforcement apparatus of a multilateral regime like the
WTO.
China’s entry into the global M&A market threatens the
fundamental assumptions of the current permissive
international regime. The rise of China-related M&A reflects
not only consolidation in China’s domestic economy but, most
importantly, China’s increasing share of cross-border
transactions. In 2016, for example, China accounted for $92
billion of net purchases in cross-border acquisitions, over ten
percent of the worldwide total and more than the United
States, with $78 billion. 5 A significant fraction of these
transactions related to critical technology such as

4 See generally I. Serdar Dinc & Isil Erel, Economic Nationalism in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 J. FIN. 2471 (2013).
5 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report 2017, at 230–231 (2017).
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semiconductors,6 domains of an articulated Chinese state
objective to become a world leader. 7
The central claim of this Article is that the cross-border
M&A regime will require a new rules-of-the-game structure to
take account of China’s ascension. This is because crossborder M&A with a Chinese acquirer adds a new dimension:
what this Article will call the “national strategic buyer”
(“NSB”), whose objective is to further the interests of a nationstate in the pursuit of national industrial policy or perhaps
national security concerns. Thus, China presents a problem of
asymmetric motives in the global M&A market: Sellers to
Chinese firms have private motives for pursuing transactions,
while at least some Chinese acquirers have non-economic
motivations. These acquirers are NSBs. Yet distinguishing
commercial and financial motives from national strategic
motives with a given Chinese acquirer is difficult. High levels
of state ownership, the murkiness of corporate ownership in
many cases, and the Communist Party’s extensive levers of
influence over all firms, whether state-owned (“SOE”) or
privately owned (“POE”), creates the potential for national
strategic motives to be involved in many transactions.
Moreover, the Chinese government’s recent clampdown on
outbound M&A to stem capital flight 8 demonstrates that the
government perceives outbound M&A as closely linked to its
overall economic strategy and views the administrative
procedures associated with outbound M&A as an important
tool of governmental economic control.
A comparison with France may be useful in illustrating the
dilemma raised by an NSB. While it may be difficult for a
foreign acquirer to gain control of a French firm due to the
relatively statist orientation of that country’s economy, the
6 See THILO HANEMANN, DANIEL H. ROSEN & CASSIE GAO, RHODIUM GRP.,
NAT’L COMM. ON U.S. CHINA RELATIONS, TWO-WAY STREET: 2018 UPDATE USCHINA DIRECT INVESTMENT TRENDS 30–34 (Apr. 2018).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 78–80.
8 See Don Weinland, China Capital Crackdown Threatens Wave of
Overseas
Buyouts,
FIN.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/091677dc-f8ec-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71 (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review).
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French government is not pursuing a national industrial
strategy of targeting foreign firms in order to obtain advanced
technologies9 or regulating the volume of outbound deal flow
in service of national economic policy.
The existence of NSBs in the cross-border M&A market
benefits target company shareholders, who are essentially
overcompensated for sale of control to the foreign acquirer
(because a portion of the premium paid for their shares
reflects the perceived industrial policy benefit to the NSB’s
home country government). Yet, this may cause distortions in
the market itself and negative welfare consequences in the
target company’s home country. These problems are
elaborated on below,10 but of particular concern is the
potential loss of long-term innovative capacity and growth
potential of the United States economy. Transfer of control
over leading-edge technologies to NSBs may occur on a scale
that diminishes “agglomeration economies” 11 in places like
Silicon Valley and that shifts the center of innovative gravity
from the United States to China.
To date, the only mechanisms for addressing the NSB
problem are national security review mechanisms for crossborder acquisitions of domestic targets at the level of separate
nation-states. In the United States, this mechanism is the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

9 This stands in stark contrast to Chinese plans, as evidence through
that country’s Made in China 2025 plan. See Li Keqiang (李克强), Zhengfu
Gongzuo Baogao—Erlingyiwu Nian San Yue Wu Ri Zai Di Shi’er Jie
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di San Ci Huiyi Shang (政府工作报告——
2015年3月5日在第十二届全国人民代表大会第三次会议上) [Work Report at
the Third Session of China’s Twelfth National People’s Congress on Mar. 5,
2015],
Xinhua
News
Agency
(Mar.
16,
2015), http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/
2015-03/16/content_2835101.htm (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review); see also infra text accompanying notes 74–80.
10 See infra Part VI.
11 Agglomeration economies refers to “the benefits that come when
firms and people locate near one another together in cities and industrial
clusters.” Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS
1 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010).
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(“CFIUS”).12 Although the precise mechanisms differ,
Australia, Canada, and a number of other countries have
adopted similar screening regimes.13 Concern over Chinese
acquisitions has prompted a recent legislative reform of the
CFIUS process.14 The reform focuses particularly on the need
to expand the range of transactions covered by the screening
mechanism to include not simply foreign acquisitions of
control, but joint ventures and other deal structures through
which a foreign participant might potentially extract sensitive
technology or otherwise exert influence in ways that could
harm United States national interests.15 Similar concerns
have produced provisional agreement on a new European
Union regulation that calls for both European Commission
screening of “strategic sector” transactions of “Union interest”
and greater coordination of screening by individual member
states.16

12 See infra text accompanying notes 87–119. For the origins of the
Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States in 1975 and its
activities for the first thirty years, see George Stephanov Georgiev, The
Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between Continued
Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. REG. 125
(2008).
13 See Frédéric Wehrlé & Joachim Pohl, Investment Policies Related to
National Security: A Survey of Country Practices (OECD Working Papers
on
Int’l.
Inv.,
No.
2016/02,
2016),
https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/5jlwrrf038nx-en.pdf?expires=1548013102&id=id&ac
cname=guest&checksum=E72D2C6145B1DE0CE27E7D6E4FBF4D79
[https://perma.cc/4CT3-UH72] (describing practices of seventeen countries);
WHITE & CASE, NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS 2017: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(2017).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 112–119.
15 Id.
16 Franck Proust, Screening of Foreign Direct Investment in Strategic
Sectors,
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
(Dec.
14,
2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-andprogressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-screening-of-foreigndirect-investment-in-strategic-sectors [https://perma.cc/F9KD-WU53]; see
also European Commission Press Release IP/18/6467, Commission
Welcomes Agreement on Foreign Investment Screening Framework (Nov.
20,
2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6467_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/6YPJ-SLTC]; infra text accompanying notes 120–129.
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This approach, legitimate in the moment, fails to take on
the crucial long-term concern of assimilating China as a
normal actor in the global economic system. A cross-border
M&A regime featuring acquirers with asymmetric motives is
not stable over the long term. As noted, amendments to the
CFIUS regime and comparable initiatives at the European
Union and member-state levels are one response. But the
national approaches differ in their details, have gaps in
coverage, and lack follow-up mechanisms to monitor the
behavior of the acquirer once a deal has been cleared.
Eventually, the presence of actors in the global M&A market
with asymmetric motives will lead to a backlash that could
disrupt global capital markets. Indeed, there are already signs
of building backlash against China. 17 While countries should
maintain these national-level screening processes, a
multilateral regime to complement the national-level
mechanisms would prevent forum shopping by NSBs and
would enhance the predictability and stability of the crossborder M&A market.
The problem of asymmetric motives could be eliminated
through a multilateral regime of mutual contestability—i.e., a
requirement that every acquirer in a cross-border deal must
itself be susceptible to takeover by a foreign buyer. In such a
regime, value-reducing acquisitions intended to serve
national strategic objectives could elicit a hostile bid; this
would serve as a check on such state insistence. Such a regime
is not politically feasible, however, as demonstrated by the
collapse of an effort to agree to such a regime at the European
Union level almost two decades ago.18

17 See, e.g., Jonathan Stearns, Amid China M&A Drive, EU Rushes for
Investment-Screening
Deal,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-04/amid-china-m-adrive-eu-rushes-for-investment-screening-deal (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review) (quoting a French member of the European
Parliament who is leading the body’s deliberations over adoption of an E.U.wide screening mechanism, prompted by concerns over China: “It’s the end
of European naivete . . . . We have to have the courage to change things.”).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 147–155 (discussing the
Thirteenth Takeover Directive for the E.U.).
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This Article sets forth the framework for a second-best
solution, in which the problem of asymmetric motives can be
mitigated through adoption of a multilateral regime under
which firms (whether SOE or POE) subject to the potential for
direct government influence in their corporate decisionmaking must demonstrate “eligibility” to engage in outbound
M&A. Our proposal contemplates that SOEs, firms subject to
a golden share held by a governmental body, or POEs with
governing-party-based internal governance organs would
commit to an “eligibility regime” before undertaking
acquisitions of foreign firms. This regime would require a
commitment to own-firm commercial or financial motives in
cross-border acquisitions made credible through a corporate
governance set-up that could verify adherence. We offer an
outline for such a regime below. The elements are foreign
ownership of a significant block of shares of the acquirer;
selection rights lodged with such foreign investors over a
number of independent directors, who are, in turn, charged
with responsibility to investigate and certify the absence of
government influence in the transaction; disclosure of
financing; and an enforcement apparatus. These specifics are
offered by way of example—other possible solutions to the
credible commitment problem are conceivable.
The regime could be developed through governmental
agreement, for example, as an add-on to the G20 Guiding
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, agreed to in
2016 during China’s presidency of the G20. 19 Alternatively,
the regime could be developed through a public-private
consultative process led by the Organisation for Economic Co-

19 See Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment
Policymaking, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [hereinafter G20 Guiding
Principles],
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-GuidingPrinciples-for-Global-Investment-Policymaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4B
5-M3PK].
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operation and Development (“OECD”). 20 The regime could be
implemented on an opt-in basis at the national level, for
example as a new element added to an existing cross-border
screening regime in lieu of an ever-expanding definition of
national security. An eligibility regime would provide
incentives for governments to reduce the number of firms
subject to such screening and would provide meaningful
discipline against a state’s efforts to advance nationalstrategic motives in cross-border M&A.
Part II surveys evidence of China’s rise as a serious player
in the global M&A market. Part III explains the role of China’s
firms as NSBs and illustrates the way this undermines the
basic assumption of symmetric private motivations on which
the global M&A market is based. Part IV examines the
existing regimes at the national level for dealing with national
security concerns and the proposals for reforming them. It
explains why these regimes do not fully address the problem
of the NSB.
Part V contains our proposal for a coordinated regime for
cross-border M&A based on the concept of “eligibility,” which
would be applied to all firms, regardless of domicile, that are
subject to potential government influence in their cross-border
acquisitions. As outlined in detail in Part V, the eligibility
criteria are designed to make it possible for an acquirer to
make a credible commitment that its cross-border acquisition
proposal is motivated by private commercial objectives rather

20 See Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to
National Security, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (May 25, 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/43384486.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KLN3-5K8K]. The OECD hosts regular Freedom of
Investment Roundtables that, among other things, led to the 2009
Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National
Security, which set forth certain non-binding recommendations on the
substance as well as review procedures.
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than national strategic objectives. 21 Credibility for the
commitment to commercial objectives would be provided by a
corporate
governance
mechanism
featuring
public
certification of the commercial objectives by independent
directors nominated by the acquirer’s foreign shareholders.
Part V also outlines an enforcement structure for the
eligibility regime featuring a secretariat (for example, under

21 This Article proposes that a firm subject to the eligibility regime
would be eligible to engage in cross-border M&A if it met the following
requirements:

(i) the company commits in its charter or other constitutive
documents to undertake foreign acquisitions solely for ownfirm financial or commercial objectives and not at the behest
of any government;
(ii) a significant portion, twenty-five percent, of the
company’s cash flow rights is available for purchase by
foreign shareholders;
(iii) the company’s governance structure provides for
independent directors, at least twenty-five percent of the
board (but no fewer than two), who will be nominated by
foreign shareholders;
(iv) in advance of a public acquisition proposal, the
independent directors are required under the acquirer’s
governance documents to prepare a report for subsequent
public release that attests to the own-firm financial or
commercial motivation and absence of government
involvement in the acquisition decision; and
(v) the company provides full disclosure of the sources of
funding for the transaction before the transaction is final.
Enforcement of the regime would consist of two elements: first, a secretariat
that can evaluate whether a would-be acquirer satisfies the eligibility
criteria both as a general matter (the company’s governance set-up) and as
to the specific transaction; second, national legislation that would permit
rejection of the acquisition of a local target by an acquirer that does not meet
the eligibility criteria.
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the auspices of the OECD) and opt-in legislation at the level
of the nation states.22
Part VI anticipates some likely objections to the proposal.
First, target shareholders are likely to benefit from aggressive
NSB activity through higher premiums. Second, NSB activity
may simply fuel more investment in the areas of great interest
to NSB acquirers. Third, restrictions on cross-border M&A are
inherently protectionist; countries have the right to choose
distinctive economic systems. Fourth, China will never go for
this, so what’s the point?23
One response is framed in terms of the interest of longterm participants in global capital markets who will regard
the explicit or implicit state support behind NSB acquisitions
as distortionary of the cross-border M&A market. Another
response looks to the emerging backlash of target-home
governments that are becoming alarmed at the use of the
cross-border M&A market to pursue national industrial
policy. Indeed, this appears to be happening currently in the

22 Our scheme is novel in its effort to use a particular mechanism of
private ordering—corporate governance—to serve global law-making
objectives, but not unprecedented in this regard. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision has recently promulgated corporate governance
guidelines which aim to use board and other corporate governance
mechanisms to constrain risk-taking by large banks in the name of the
global objective to maintain financial stability. See KPMG, BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION – GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS (2015), https://assets.kpmg/content/
dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/Corporate-Governance-Principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UPQ-5S7G].
23 An objection from a different direction is that our proposal is too
limited in scope, as it addresses only M&A and not foreign direct investment
that may have a similar national strategic stimulus. The problems of a
“national strategic investor” are ultimately less serious than those posed by
a “national strategic buyer” because of the control rights that are shifted in
M&A; the influence of a national strategic investor is subject to limitations
imposed by the target company board and its conduct is more susceptible to
monitoring by the government where the target is located through such
measures as the export control regime. However, the eligibility regime
contemplated by our proposal could be expanded to include strategic
investments (as defined under the regime) that fall short of a change of
control.

206

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

developed world in regard to Chinese investment.24 This
concern extends beyond a particular acquisition and identifies
a systemic threat, including the loss of leading technologies to
the NSB and the NSB-home country, with potentially serious
ramifications for the target-home country’s long-term
economic capacity and military capability. In the words of a
United States Department of Defense report:
While it is likely that China’s investment in
technology is driven in part by commercial interests,
it is unlikely this is the sole reason given China’s
explicit technology goals. . . . The principal vehicles [to
enable transfer of technology] are investments in
early-stage technologies as well as acquisitions. When
viewed individually, some of these practices may seem
commonplace and not unlike those employed by other
countries. However, when viewed in combination, and
with the resources China is applying, the composite
picture illustrates the intent, design and dedication of
a regime focused on technology transfer at a massive
scale.25

The “eligibility regime” sustains the relatively open crossborder M&A regime that helps knit together a global economic
system, rather than advancing the interests of any particular
nations. Global M&A is a complement to a global trade
regime, and together these global regimes serve the long-term
project of peaceful national economic competition and the
24 See Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese FDI in the US in
2017: A Double Policy Punch, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-us-2017-double-policy-punch/
[https://perma.cc/UCB6-55K6] (“China epitomizes the ‘countries of special
concern’ [pending legislation to bolster the U.S. investment screening
process] is concerned with, and in expanding the types of transactions
subject to screening, a significant share of the marginal growth in foreign
investment in the US would be treated with suspicion.”).
25 MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT
EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW CHINESE
INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR
TO ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 5, 16 (2018),
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnology
transferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/8UNJ-LGKZ].
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spread of economic well-being. These values cannot be
forgotten as nations struggle with the dislocations and the
consequence of the global economic system. The “eligibility
regime” uses tools from the corporate governance toolbox in
the service of internationalist objectives rather than grander
international law schema.
Why would China, or any other regime that imposes on its
firms an NSB obligation, ever subject itself to such discipline?
It is unlikely that China’s political leadership would find the
loss of this lever of influence over the economy attractive. But
as the national security screening mechanisms in advanced
western economies proliferate and tighten, it will be in
China’s national interest to accede to a harmonized M&A
regime that minimizes the “suspicion tax” under which many
Chinese firms currently operate in global markets. Moreover,
at least on a rhetorical level, China’s leadership has expressed
support for the type of agreed-upon rules-of-the-game
approach in support of global markets that this Article
advocates. At the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos,
President Xi Jinping called for an open global economy and
projected himself as a chief statesman on behalf of global
governance.26 He explained China’s decision to join the WTO
as reflecting “the conclusion that integration into the global
economy is a historical trend. To grow its economy, China
must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global
market.”27 Support for a multilateral regime that constrains
mercantilist, national-strategic motivations for deals would
demonstrate China’s commitment to sound governance of the
global market for cross-border M&A.

II. CHINA’S RISE AS A PLAYER IN GLOBAL M&A
As Figure 2 demonstrates, China has become an
increasingly important player in cross-border M&A. Over a
26 See Xi Jinping, President, People’s Republic of China, President Xi’s
Speech to Davos (Jan. 17, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynoteat-the-world-economic-forum/ [https://perma.cc/8LML-GEDM]).
27 Id.
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twenty-year period, there has been a steady increase in both
the annual value of the cross-border transactions entered into
by Chinese firms and the fraction of worldwide cross-border
M&A activity that is China-related. This increase has been
particularly pronounced in the post-global financial crisis
period, especially from 2015–17. Perhaps more remarkable
has been the shift in the composition of China-related crossborder M&A from predominantly inbound earlier in the
period to predominantly outbound. Measured by value, by the
time of the financial crisis, the outbound/inbound ratio
reached 60/40; in recent years, it has been closer to 80/20.
Measured by number of deals, the outbound/inbound ratio is
60/40, reflecting that outbound deals have been larger. See
Figure 3.
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Figure 228

Figure 329

28 Deals,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters.
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
29 Id.
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The starkest comparisons show up when the definition of
“M&A” is limited to transactions for control, meaning
acquisitions that result in obtaining an ownership position of
more than fifty percent of the target’s stock. When control is
at issue, the data show a pronounced skew towards outbound
transactions throughout a decade-long period (measured by
value).30 Inbound acquisitions for control tend to come from
Hong Kong companies (which may be under the control of
Chinese owners; the data do not indicate). 31 In the case of
China-related M&A activity involving the United States and
Europe, Figure 4 shows that inbound transactions for control
appear to be rare; the direction of deal flow for control
transactions is overwhelmingly outbound. Chinese firms are
acquirers in control transactions in the United States and
Europe, not targets. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that over the
2015–17 period, most of the outbound acquisition value was
reflected in transactions in which Chinese acquirers obtained
more than ninety percent of the target’s stock.

See infra Figure 4, right-hand column for each year.
See Deals, THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters.
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
30
31
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III. CHINA AS A NATIONAL STRATEGIC BUYER
As demonstrated in the preceding Part, China’s economic
rise and growing participation in the global economy have
introduced a new player in cross-border M&A—the Chinese
acquirer, which overwhelmingly seeks a dominant, if not onehundred-percent, ownership position. Outwardly familiar and
cloaked in corporate form, the Chinese acquirer has qualities
that defy conventional categories and make assessment of its
motives difficult. This is so for several reasons rooted in the
Chinese political economy. First, SOEs, which have led the
surge in Chinese outbound acquisitions, have distinctive
ownership structures and institutionalized linkages to the
Communist Party that influence their governance in
unprecedented ways.34 Second, because their corporate
governance is channeled through Chinese institutions of
political governance, the SOEs facilitate “policy channeling”—
the use of state-controlled companies (and non-controlling
private shareholders’ investments) as a means of
implementing public policy.35 If SOEs were the only Chinese
firms engaged in cross-border acquisitions, the problem of
asymmetric motives might find relatively straightforward
policy solutions.36 But large Chinese private firms are
increasingly active in cross-border M&A, and they present a
third conundrum for assessing a Chinese buyer’s motives: the
conventional dichotomy between state-owned and privately

34 See generally Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National)
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China,
65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013).
35 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs:
Tunneling, Propping, and Policy Channeling, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröeger eds.)
(forthcoming 2019).
36 See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2016 REPORT TO
CONGRESS 507 (Nov. 2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77UL-2YED] (recommending a ban on acquisitions of
United States corporations by Chinese SOEs).
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owned enterprises is blurred in China.37 Due to heavy state
intervention in the economy, party penetration of all
significant organizations in society, and weak institutions to
check state power, all large firms—whether SOEs, POEs, or
mixed ownership enterprises—survive and prosper by
remaining in the good graces of the party-state. Proximity to
the party-state provides a roadmap of industrial policy goals,
the pursuit of which generates rents such as subsidies, statebacked finance, and market protections. As a result, large
firms in China exhibit substantial similarities in their
relationship with the state in ways that do not depend on
equity ownership. These distinctive Chinese corporate traits
are discussed in turn.

A. SOE Ownership Structure and Governance 38
More than half of Chinese Fortune Global 500 companies
are national-level SOEs.39 These SOEs are structured as
massive business groups whose formation in the 1990s was
inspired by the apparent success of the Japanese keiretsu and
South Korean chaebol in propelling economic development in
those countries.40 The parent (holding) company of an SOE
business group has only one shareholder: an agency formed
under the State Council (China’s cabinet) known as the Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(“SASAC”), which acts as both an investor on behalf of the
Chinese people and as a regulatory agency.41 The holding
company serves as an intermediary between SASAC and the
other group member firms.42 It coordinates strategy and
resource allocation within the group, transmits policy
downward from Chinese regulators to group members, and

37 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 671 (2015).
38 The account in this Section follows Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34.
Readers desiring more detail are directed to that publication.
39 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34, at 699.
40 Id. at 709–15.
41 Id. at 699–700, 734–45.
42 Id. at 717.
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provides information upward from the group to state
strategists and regulators.43 The global face of a Chinese SOE,
however, is not the holding company, but one or more of its
publicly traded subsidiaries. 44 While the publicly traded
subsidiaries have private (non-state) shareholders, ultimate
control resides with the party-state through SASAC’s indirect
ownership of a substantial percentage of the publicly traded
company’s equity,45 along with other unusual governance
rights discussed below.
Atop the national SOE business groups is SASAC, the sole
shareholder of the central SOE holding companies. SASAC
has a long list of formal functions and responsibilities,
including preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned
assets, appointing and removing top SOE executives, setting
remuneration for SOE personnel and regulating income
distribution among senior SOE managers, dispatching
supervisory panels to the SOEs, and drafting regulations on
the management of state-owned assets.46
The legal foundation for SASAC’s role in the SOE system
is the Law of the People’s Republic of China on State-Owned
Assets of Enterprises (“SOE Asset Law”). 47 In essence, the law
formally recognizes SASAC as an investor—a shareholder in
the national SOEs, with the rights and duties of a

Id.
Id. at 711.
45 SASAC is the sole shareholder of ninety-seven parent holding
companies that in turn control 340 publicly traded subsidiaries. See Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Author Calculations Based on Publicly
Available Information (on file with authors).
46 See What We Do, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND
ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE COUNCIL (July 17, 2018),
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm [https://perma.cc/4CPR-NRQ7].
47 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa (中华
人民共和国企业国有资产法)
[State-owned
Enterprise
Asset
Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008,
effective May 1, 2009). The SOE Asset Law was enacted for the purpose of
“consolidating and developing the state-owned economy, strengthening the
protection of state-owned assets, giving play to the leading role of the stateowned economy in the national economy, and promoting the development of
the socialist market economy.” Id. at art. 1.
43
44
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shareholder.48 But the law contains some provisions that alter
the ordinary rights of a shareholder under standard corporate
law principles. For example, Article 34 requires that SASAC
obtain government approval before exercising its rights as a
shareholder with respect to the “merger, splitting, dissolution
or petition for bankruptcy of an important” SOE under its
supervision.49 Article 22 gives SASAC the power to appoint
and remove senior managers in the SOEs under its
supervision.50
The corporate ownership structure just outlined, however,
conveys an incomplete picture of the governance mechanics in
Chinese SOEs. Equally or more important are the
mechanisms by which the SOE business groups are linked
with institutions of the central government and the Chinese
Communist Party. For example, a number of positions in
government and party bodies, such as the National People’s
Congress and the National People’s Political Consultative
Conference, are reserved for leaders of the national SOEs, and
senior managers of national SOEs sometimes simultaneously
hold important positions in the party, the government, or
industrial
associations
that
perform
governmental
functions.51
Institutionalized party penetration of the corporate form
mirrors the party’s parallel governance structures vis-à-vis
the organs of government. There are two personnel systems in
all national Chinese SOEs: the regular corporate
management system and the party system. 52 In the corporate
management system, positions are similar to those found in
firms elsewhere in the world, including chief executive officer
(“CEO”), Vice-CEO, chief accountant, and independent board
members.53 Senior management appointments are made in a
highly institutionalized arrangement between SASAC and the

48
49
50
51
52
53

See id. at arts. 11–14.
See id. at art. 34.
See id. at art. 22.
See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 34, at 727–28.
Id. at 737.
Id.
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party.54 While appointments power formally resides with
SASAC, senior appointments are made with input from
various party organs and ministries regulating relevant
business operations and are subject to approval by the State
Council.55 The leadership team in the parallel party system
includes the secretary of the party committee, several deputy
secretaries, and a secretary of an anti-corruption office called
the Discipline Inspection Commission. 56 Overlaps between
the two systems are rather uniform, such that a corporate
manager of a given rank typically holds a position of
equivalent rank in the party system.57 The articles of
association of the SOEs, for example, require the chairman of
the board to concurrently serve as the secretary of the
company’s party committee.
The presence of the party throughout the SOE system is
concretely manifest in party committees, established within
SASAC and, pursuant to Chinese Company Law, within each
SOE group member corporation.58 These committees play
some corporate roles, such as performing supervisory and
personnel functions. But they also have political functions,
such as building allegiance to party principles and
disseminating campaigns announced by senior government
leaders. In recent years, high-level government and party
organs have issued policies seeking to reinforce the party’s
leadership in SOEs, and the principle of party leadership in
SOEs has recently been enshrined in the Constitution of the

Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 738.
56 Id. at 737.
57 Id.
58 Zhonghua Gonghe Guo Gongsi Fa (中华共和国公司法) [Company Law
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, revised Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 1,
2014), art. 19.
54
55
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Chinese Communist Party.59 Guidelines issued by SASAC
and the Ministry of Finance provide a template for SOEs to
amend their articles of association so as to weave the principle
of party leadership into their constitutive documents. 60 For
companies that have adopted the provisions in the template,
the party committee is now effectively superior to the board of
directors with respect to material business decisions and
senior management appointments.61
Thus, the party, working through SASAC and companylevel party committees, is able to bypass or influence boards
of directors in the appointment, removal, remuneration, and
supervision of senior managers, and with respect to major
business decisions. However, given that senior corporate
managers simultaneously hold senior party positions within
the firm, direct conflict between decisions of the party and the
board is unlikely. Rather, as a consequence of the party’s
shadow corporate governance rights, the board’s decisions are
likely to anticipate and dovetail with the interests of the
party.

59 See, e.g., CONST. OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, Oct. 24, 2017,
art. 33 (“The leading . . . Party committees of state-owned enterprises shall
play a leadership role, set the right direction . . . and discuss and decide on
major issues of their enterprise in accordance with regulations.”) (emphasis
added); Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China & the State Council,
Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China and the State Council on Deepening State-Owned Enterprise Reform,
LEXIS CHINA, Aug. 24, 2015, at I.2. (“Insist on the leadership of the Stateowned enterprises by the party[.]”).
60 Angela Huyue Zhang & Zhuang Liu, Ownership and Political
Control: Evidence from Charter Amendments 7–8 (July 12, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
61 See Houze Song, State-Owned Enterprise Reforms: Untangling
Ownership, Control, and Corporate Governance, MACROPOLO.ORG (Dec. 4,
2017),
https://macropolo.org/anaysis/state-owned-enterprise-reformsuntangling-ownership-control-corporate-governance/
[https://perma.cc/6LB5-E6J8] (“[D]ecision-makers now favor putting the
Party committee atop the board as the ultimate authority in an SOE.”).
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1. Policy Channeling
In firms with dispersed, diversified shareholders,
shareholder wealth is affected by corporate decisions only
through their impact on stock price. As a result, shareholders
will agree about the corporation’s objective function: it should
act to increase the value of the corporation’s stock. But this
separation theorem does not hold in a variety of contexts,
including where the government acts as the controlling
shareholder of an SOE with public (non-state) minority
shareholders. In this case, while shareholder value
maximization is the goal of the non-state shareholders, the
state may use the corporation (effectively or otherwise) to
serve public policy objectives—a strategy one of us in previous
work has called “policy channeling.”62 These objectives might
include maintaining employment, pursuing industrial policy
goals, or securing state control over the commanding heights
of the economy. States may engage in policy channeling
because it is perceived as a lower-cost substitute for regulation
in weak institutional environments,63 for ideological reasons,
or because the SOE insulates government action and
distributive decisions from public scrutiny and participation.
Policy channeling can of course be found outside China—it
is one of the principal theoretical explanations for state
ownership of business enterprise everywhere. But the
governance characteristics of Chinese SOEs described above
make them unusually powerful instruments of policy
channeling. Thorough party penetration of the SOEs’
corporate governance structures suggests that the goal of this
massive network of firms is to maximize social rather than
shareholder welfare. Or to put it differently, China’s leaders

Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 35, at 1.
See id. For an analysis of Chinese SOEs as an efficient response to
high regulatory costs in a weak institutional environment, see generally Si
Zeng, State Ownership as a Substitute for Costly Regulation: A Law and
Economic Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises in China (Feb. 14, 2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2916985 [https://perma.cc/8BV3-VXMT].
62
63
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view the SOEs as a means of maximizing welfare at the
country, rather than the corporate, level.

2. Blurred SOE-POE Dichotomy
The impact of China’s political economy on corporate
governance and objectives extends well beyond SOEs,
rendering distinctions among firms based on ownership
misleading.64 The boundary between public and private
enterprise has long been blurred in China, a country with a
tradition of state intervention in the economy, inchoate
notions of property rights, and a history of economic reform
strategies relying heavily on mixed (state and private)
ownership of the means of production.65 State-generated rents
are distributed not only to SOEs, but also to POEs perceived
to be furthering state objectives. The human agents managing
SOEs and POEs in China respond in similar fashion to the
institutional environment: fostering close personal ties to
government and party organs, seeking state largesse, and
remaining in the good graces of political leaders are important
to the success of all firms in China. One indication of the
gravitational pull of the party-state in the corporate realm is
widespread membership in government and party organs by
the founders of large POEs, in the same way that high-level
SOE executives are affiliated with these organs.66 Thus,
functionally, SOEs and large POEs “share many similarities
in the areas commonly thought to distinguish state-owned
firms from privately owned firms: market access, receipt of
state subsidies, proximity to state power, and execution of the

See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 669.
See id. at 671.
66 See id. at 684 (finding that ninety-five out of one hundred founders
or chief executives of the largest POEs in China are, or formerly were,
members of party and government organs; same for eight of the top ten
largest Chinese internet-based firms). Access to the finance necessary to
accomplish cross-border M&A is strongly influenced by political connections
of the POE principals. See Denis Schweizer, Thomas Walker & Aoran
Zhang., Cross-Border Acquisitions by Chinese Enterprises: The Benefits and
Disadvantages of Political Connections, J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2019).
64
65
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government’s policy objectives.”67 The identity of a Chinese
firm’s equity owners thus provides relatively little
information about the degree of autonomy the firm enjoys
from the state.
Nevertheless, as Chinese cross-border M&A activity has
ratcheted up, the composition of Chinese acquirers has shifted
from SOEs to POEs.68 SOE acquisitions attract heightened
scrutiny under existing regulatory regimes. For POEs, the
government connections and support are not as obvious and
thus POE transactions are less likely to be challenged.
Schweizer et al. report a pronouncement to this effect by a
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference:
Given the fact that SOEs often experience setbacks
when acquiring foreign companies in advanced
economies, POEs are encouraged to acquire the high
technology for the growth of China’s economy.
Because POEs rarely have Chinese government
background, they can avoid the scrutiny from foreign
governments
targeting
Chinese
SOEs.
The
government should provide financing to POEs for
their cross-border deals and even state-owned
companies could provide funding in the background to
POEs.69

The shift from SOEs to POEs is reflected in the data.
Figure 6 shows that the number of POE cross-border
acquisitions now far outstrips SOE acquisitions. Figure 7
shows that, by value, POE acquisitions have become
increasingly important but that SOEs undertake significant
acquisitions as well.

Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 668.
See infra Figure 6.
69 Schweizer et al., supra note 66, at 2 (quoting Zhang Hongwei
(CPPCC) Suggests to Diversify the Methods of Overseas Investment on
Energy, SINA (Mar. 8, 2010), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-0308/120919815889.shtml (in Chinese) [https://perma.cc/75QD-CJ9P]).
67
68
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Figure 670

Figure 771

70 Deals,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://developers.thomsonreuters.
com/content/deals-mergers-acquisitions-and-new-issues
[https://perma.cc/R924-L4Z5] (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
71 Id.
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3. Summary
Large Chinese corporations have a number of highly
distinctive traits resulting from China’s political and
economic systems. This Article highlights these traits not to
pass judgment on Chinese economic governance structures,
but to underscore that the multilateral trade and investment
regimes that took shape in the post-war period simply do not
contemplate this type of actor.72 It is thus not surprising that
the emergence of Chinese firms as major participants in the
global economy has generated anxiety in the countries where
these firms are active. To quote from a prior work:
Suspicions about foreign investments by Chinese
firms, regardless of ownership, are likely to remain as
long as the state retains equity interests in ostensibly
private enterprises; the government routinely
provides subsidies and privileged market access to
state-linked firms; and it is common practice for senior
executives at major firms, SOE or POE, to be affiliated
with the party-state in various capacities. In short,
suspicions about foreign investments by Chinese firms
will linger as long as the institutional foundations of
Chinese state capitalism remain intact.73

B. Illustration: Made in China 2025
Made in China 2025 (“MIC 2025”), issued by the State
Council in May 2015, is the Chinese government’s policy
response to challenges facing the country’s domestic
manufacturing industry.74 While China’s manufacturing
72 See generally Mark Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic
Structure, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 313 (Benjamin L. Liebman &
Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2016).
73 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 37, at 707.
74 The first official appearance of “Made in China 2025” was the 2015
government report by Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Li Keqiang, Zhengfu
Gongzuo Baogao (政府工作报告) [Government Work Report], CENTRAL
PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 16,
2015), http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-03/16/content_2835101.htm
[https://perma.cc/R8AH-QWWR].
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industry is huge, it has not produced a large number of
indigenously developed, globally competitive products and
still depends heavily on core technologies developed by foreign
companies. MIC 2025 identifies ten priority sectors
accounting for forty percent of China’s value-added
manufacturing, including next-generation information
technology, aviation, new materials, and biosciences.75 It sets
domestic market share targets for various products, such as
new energy vehicles, mobile phone chips, and wide-body
aircraft, as well as targets for innovation, quality, digitization,
and green development.76 Among the policy tools actually or
allegedly being used by the Chinese central and local
governments to implement MIC 2025 are forced technology
transfers in exchange for market access, government-backed
investment funds, and acquisition of foreign technology
through outbound investment.77
Evidence of state-led investment tied to MIC 2025
priorities is most evident in the information technology
industry, where outbound Chinese investments in the
semiconductor industry skyrocketed in 2014 and 2015 after
the Chinese central government promulgated guidelines on

75 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, M ADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL
AMBITIONS
BUILT
ON
LOCAL
PROTECTIONS
6,
10
(2017),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_
report_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VJC-W23G].
76 See id. at 65–80; see also id. at 6 (noting that MIC 2025 “appears to
provide preferential access to capital to domestic companies in order to
promote their indigenous research and development capabilities, support
their ability to acquire technology from abroad, and enhance their overall
competitiveness . . . MIC 2025 constitutes a broader strategy to use state
resources to alter and create comparative advantage in these sectors on a
global scale.”).
77 See EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, CHINA
MANUFACTURING 2025: PUTTING INDUSTRIAL POLICY AHEAD OF MARKET
FORCES 15–16
(2017), http://docs.dpaq.de/12007-european_chamber
_cm2025-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PG2-WKR9].
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promotion of the national integrated circuit industry.78 The
Rhodium Group, a private firm that gathers data on Chinese
investment in the United States, concluded that
semiconductors are “the clearest example yet of the nexus
between strategic high-tech policy and outbound investment
in today’s China.”79
As the semi-conductor example suggests, given the
political economy context in which Chinese firms operate,
MIC 2025 is more than a simple statement of government
policy. It is a roadmap for Chinese firms in their pursuit of
profitable investments. In the words of a European Union
Chamber of Commerce in China report,
[T]he priorities and targets that the [MIC 2025]
outlines will have sent a strong message to provincial
and local governments, SOEs and private Chinese
companies regarding the central government’s
priorities. This will have given them a clear idea of
where subsidies, other forms of support, and therefore
near-term opportunities for profit, can be expected to
flow.80

The report notes a surge in Chinese investment into
European firms in the wake of MIC 2025’s publication,
quoting a State Council directive that “SOEs should be
encouraged to carry out acquisitions and mergers with a focus
on developing strategies and a goal for attaining key
technologies and core resources.”81 The report asks whether
MIC 2025 “amount[s] to a shopping list of technologies that
the country has not been able to develop at home” and
concludes,

78 See THILO HANEMANN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, RHODIUM GRP., CHINESE
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: RECENT TRENDS AND THE POLICY AGENDA
77–78
(2016)
https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Chinese_
Investment_in_the_United_States_Rhodium.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA35J2AQ].
79 Id. at 81.
80 EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, supra note 77, at
13.
81 Id. at 19.
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While it is perfectly standard for private business to
make strategic acquisitions, their decisions should
ultimately be informed by the profit motive.
Investments made by firms in response to their
government’s industrial policies or strategic interests
may be completely at odds with the interests of the
country into which the investment is made.82

A United States Chamber of Commerce report expresses
similar sentiments, citing global concerns that outbound
Chinese investments tied to industrial policy result in the
acquisition of foreign technology.83
The European Union and United States Chamber of
Commerce reports might be discounted as scaremongering by
China’s global competitors. Some of the reports’ language is
reminiscent of fears expressed about Japanese industrial
policy in the 1980s, which turned out to be unfounded. But
several considerations suggest that the concerns raised by
these bodies should be taken seriously. First, at a conceptual
level, it is not unreasonable to think that cross-border M&A
could be a vehicle for advancing the power of a state actor,
particularly an authoritarian regime with lofty global
ambitions. Second, government policy does, in fact, influence
outbound deal flow and acquisition targets. A steep decline in
Chinese foreign direct investment (“FDI”) into the United
States in 2017 was caused by Beijing’s clampdown on capital
outflows in order to stem a decline in foreign exchange
reserves as well as its limiting of overseas deal-making by
large private firms, in an effort to reduce leverage in the
financial sector.84 Third, Chinese press reports indicate that
most of the cross-border deals are not profitable for the
companies that enter into them, 85 suggesting that their
Id.
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 75, at 23–24.
84 See Hanemann & Rosen, supra note 24.
85 Schweizer et al., supra note 66, at 3 (citing The Cross-Border M&A
of Chinese Companies Have Been Experiencing Exponential Growth, but
Only 13% of the Deals are Profitable, SINA FINANCE (Oct. 8, 2016),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-10-08/doc-ifxwrhpm2611573.shtml
[https://perma.cc/G53T-EYXW]).
82
83
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impetus comes from government direction with the implicit
promise of government financial support. Fourth,
independent analysts echo the concerns voiced in the
European Union and United States Chamber of Commerce
reports.86 Fifth, the reaction of governments around the world
to Chinese outbound investment indicates that the concerns
expressed in these reports are widely shared by lawmakers
and policymakers, and that a backlash is building due to the
perception that China is using a liberal regime for national
gain. It is to the policy reactions around the world that this
Article now turns.

IV. EXISTING REGIMES AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM
A. The United States
Concerns that foreign investors may pose a threat to host
countries are of course not new. The United States has had a
regime to examine the national security implications of
foreign direct investment since 1975. This regime, centered in
CFIUS, was created by executive order providing that CFIUS
would have the “primary continuing responsibility within the
Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign
investment in the United States, both direct and portfolio, and
for coordinating the implementation of United States policy
on such investment.”87 CFIUS is an interagency committee
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and comprised of the
heads of numerous executive branch agencies, including the

86 See, e.g., Evaluating CFIUS: Challenges Posed by a Changing Global
Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy & Trade of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 2–6 (2018) (statement of Scott
Kennedy, Center for Strategic and International Studies); id. (statement of
Derek Scissors, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute).
87 Exec. Order No. 11,858 § 1(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975).
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Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, and
Homeland Security.88
In 1988, amidst concerns over Japanese acquisitions of
United States firms, Congress approved the Exon-Florio
amendment to the Defense Production Act, granting the
president authority to block mergers and acquisitions that
threaten national security.89 The Exon-Florio amendment
provides a statutory basis for the national security screening
process undertaken by CFIUS. By executive order, President
Reagan delegated his authority to administer the Exon-Florio
provision to CFIUS. As a result,
CFIUS was transformed from an administrative body
with limited authority to review and analyze data on
foreign investment to an important component of U.S.
foreign investment policy with a broad mandate and
significant authority to advise the President on
foreign investment transactions and to recommend
that some transactions be suspended or blocked.90

Until the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act (“FIRRMA”) in August 2018, discussed
infra, the CFIUS regime was governed by the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”),
implemented by executive order in 2008. 91 FINSA codified
CFIUS itself,92 along with various elements of the CFIUS
process that had emerged since the Exon-Florio amendment,
and strengthened CFIUS in various ways, such as broadening
88 Composition
of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreigninvestment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL6A-PZFJ] (last
updated Dec. 1, 2010).
89 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (1988).
90 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 6
(2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33388
[https://perma.cc/465G-KLD8].
91 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-49, § 3, 121 Stat. 246, 252 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565
(2012)); Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4,677 (Jan. 25, 2008).
92 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 3.
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the definition of national security to include threats to
homeland security and “critical infrastructure.”93 By law,
CFIUS is required to review all “covered” foreign investment
transactions.94 A covered transaction is defined as a “merger,
acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any foreign person
which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States.” 95 CFIUS must also
review any transaction that could result in control by a
“foreign government-controlled” entity.96
Under FINSA, the CFIUS review process was comprised of
three stages. The first stage was a thirty-day national security
review to determine whether the investment threatened to
impair national security, critical infrastructure, homeland
security, or was state-backed or controlled.97 If no risks were
found or such risks were resolved, no further action was
necessary and the transaction was granted a safe harbor.98 If
risks were not resolved or if a foreign state controlled the
acquirer, review moved to the second stage, a national
security investigation of up to forty-five days.99 During this
period, CFIUS could impose conditions, develop interim
protections, or negotiate mitigation agreements. 100 If
outstanding concerns were not resolved, CFIUS could send a
negative recommendation to the President. The President had
fifteen days to make a determination. 101 At any time during
Id. § 2(a)(5).
Id. § 2(b)(1)(A).
95 Id. § 2(a)(3). Purchases by a foreign person of ten percent or less of
the voting securities of a United States business solely for purposes of
passive investment are not “covered” transactions. Treas. Reg. § 800.302(b)
(2008).
96 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 § 2(b)(1)(B);
see also id. § (2)(a)(4).
97 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1) (2012).
98 See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS, OVERVIEW OF THE CFIUS PROCESS
(2017), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process,
[https://perma.cc/94GT-ZSGR]; MARIO MANCUSO, A DEALMAKER’S GUIDE TO
CFIUS (2017).
99 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(2)(C) (2012).
100 JACKSON, supra note 90, at 13.
101 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2) (2012).
93
94
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this process, parties could withdraw and, if desired, re-file
their notice. Prior to these formal stages, CFIUS often
engaged in an informal pre-filing review of proposed
transactions to identify potential issues. 102 Informal review
could benefit foreign acquirers, for example, by allowing them
to avoid negative publicity stemming from having a proposed
transaction blocked.103
Historically, very few transactions have been blocked
under the CFIUS process, 104 but the pace of blocked or
abandoned deals appears to be on the rise. Only two
transactions were blocked from the inception of CFIUS
through 2012.105 One reason for the low number of negative
Presidential determinations is that foreign acquirers may
withdraw their filing—particularly if the process moves from
the first (review) stage to the second (investigatory) stage—in
order to avoid potential negative consequences from having a
transaction blocked.106 However, three transactions involving
Chinese acquirers have been blocked in the past two years,
and one was abandoned. 107 The proposed acquisition of
JACKSON, supra note 90, at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
104 Nevertheless, FINSA’s formalization of the review process has
imposed costs on shareholders of potential United States targets of crossborder M&A. See David Godsell, Ugur Lel & Darius Miller, Financial
Protectionism, M&A Activity, and Shareholder Wealth (SMU Cox School of
Business Research Paper No. 18-23, 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3147404 [https://perma.cc/5SW7-FDWM] (finding significant
decline in foreign takeovers of firms more likely to attract CFIUS scrutiny
and negative shareholder returns of 4.2% of such firms, relative to a control
group, upon adoption of FINSA).
105 See MANCUSO, supra note 98, at 4, 54.
106 Id. at 21–22 (reporting that in the 2008–15 period, four percent of
transactions notified to CFIUS were withdrawn during the initial thirtyday review period and six percent were withdrawn during an investigation).
107 The blocked transactions are: Fujian Grand Chip Investment
Fund’s proposed acquisition of Axtron, a German semiconductor firm with
assets in the United States; Lattice Semiconductor’s acquisition by Canyon
Bridge Capital Partners, a Silicon Valley-based venture capital firm with
funding from the Chinese government; and Ant Financial’s proposed
acquisition of MoneyGram. Huawei abandoned plans to partner with AT&T
to sell smartphones in the United States.
102
103
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Qualcomm, a leading United States developer of 5G
technology, by Broadcom, a company in the process of
transitioning from a Singapore domicile to Delaware, was
blocked in 2018 on the grounds that “a weakening of
Qualcomm’s position [as a result of its acquisition by a foreign
buyer taking a “private equity-style” approach to reducing
R&D in favor of short-term profitability] would leave an
opening for China to expand its influence on the 5G standardsetting process.”108 Given the level of concern in Washington
about Chinese direct investment and that China was the
home country of the acquirer in more CFIUS-covered
transactions than any other country in the period from 2013
to 2015 (the most recent years for which data are available),109
the rarity of negative presidential determinations may be a
thing of the past. Alternatively, the negative climate could
have a chilling effect on Chinese investment proposals so that
outright rejections may remain infrequent.
Over time, a consensus emerged in the United States
government and policy communities that the CFIUS process

108 Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Inv. Sec., to
Mark Plotkin, Covington & Burling L.L.P., & Theodore Kassinger,
O’Melveny & Myers L.L.P. 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/804328/000110465918015036/a18-7296_7ex99d1.htm
[https://perma.cc/H6QM-QDHT].
109 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
REPORT PERIOD CY 2015, at 16–17 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/Unclassified
%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20-%20(report%20period%20CY
%202015).pdf [https://perma.cc/K975-BHXW]. The unclassified version of
the annual report is released with a two-year lag.
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was outdated and inadequate under the FINSA regime.110
Chinese investments were the catalyst for these concerns,
both because of the rapid increase of such investments into
the United States and suspicions that some Chinese
investments had been structured to circumvent CFIUS
review. This situation not only posed potential threats to
national security, but it also introduced a new level of
regulatory uncertainty for deal planners. A January 2018 law
firm memo to clients summed up these sentiments as follows:
The CFIUS process is under significant pressure. The
Committee’s caseload is larger than it can reasonably
handle with existing resources; the government
doubts its own ability to monitor rapid technological
changes that could present threats to national
security; and the fastest growing source of technology
investment — China — is becoming the United States’
strongest technology competitor but lacks the shared
security alliances enjoyed by other countries. In that
setting, businesses’ ability to assess, accommodate
and respond to CFIUS risk has become even more
tenuous than in the past.111

110 One analysis by a prominent think tank concluded that “[t]he
CFIUS process is working” but warned that “emerging trends bear close
monitoring as they could—over time—reduce the effectiveness of the
[current CFIUS] system. Specifically, these include the increasing
complexity of transactions, the growing role of foreign government-owned
or controlled entities in mergers and acquisitions, [and] the growing number
of cases filed with CFIUS[.]” ANDREW HUNTER & JOHN SCHAUS, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CSIS REVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2016), https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161207_Hunter_CFIUS_
Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L25-86B8].
111 Trends and Updates in the CFIUS Space, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL
LLP 5 (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-0116_trends_updates_in_the_cfius_space.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XKS-NP65].
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In response to these concerns, FIRRMA was introduced in
Congress in 2017 and enacted in August 2018. 112 The
legislation, which will require detailed rulemaking by the
Treasury Department in order to be fully operational, has
several key features. First, it expands the scope of
transactions CFIUS may consider to include non-passive but
non-controlling investments in United States businesses
involving sensitive personal data, critical infrastructure, or
critical technology, as well as certain real estate
transactions.113 Second, it changes the timeline for CFIUS
review by adding fifteen days to the initial review period and
permits the Secretary of the Treasury to add fifteen days at
the back end of an investigation in “extraordinary
circumstances.”114 Third, it creates a dual-track filing system:
abbreviated notices of transactions that pose low national
security risk, and mandatory filings for certain transactions
in which foreign governments have a “substantial interest.”115
CFIUS is permitted to establish other categories of mandatory
filings for acquisitions involving “critical technologies.”116
Fourth, and in the spirit of the proposal advanced in this
Article, FIRRMA permits the Treasury Department to share
information with foreign allied governments and requires
CFIUS to establish a formal process for doing so. 117 Proposals
for more fundamental changes, such as allowing CFIUS to
consider the broader economic effects of a proposed
investment as part of its review process, 118 or requiring
112 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, S.
2098, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R. 4311, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted);
Subtitle A of Title XVII of Pub. L. 115-232 (Aug. 13, 2018). See generally E.
Maddy Berg, Note, A Tale of Two Statutes: Using IEEPA’s Accountability
Safeguards to Inspire CFIUS Reform, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1763 (2018).
113 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1703.
114 Id. § 1709.
115 See id. § 1706.
116 Id. § 1703(a)(4)(B)(iii)(II). The Treasury Department has adopted a
pilot program to review certain transactions involving foreign persons and
critical technologies. See 31 C.F.R. § 801 (2018).
117 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 § 1713.
118 See United States Foreign Investment Review Act of 2017, S. 1983,
115th Cong. (2017).
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CFIUS to consider whether the home country of the acquirer
offers reciprocity to foreign investors,119 were not enacted as
part of FIRRMA.

B. The European Union and Member States
Currently, the European Union is in the midst of
fashioning an E.U.-level process that would give the European
Commission (the “Commission”) the responsibility of vetting,
on national security grounds, cross-border transactions of
“Union interest,” yet would leave the final decision to the
member state that is geographically connected to the
transaction.120 This new regulation comes against the
backdrop of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits restrictions on the
movement of capital between member states and between
member states and “third countries,” except where necessary
to achieve certain defined objectives, including public
security.121 E.U.-level investment constraints have previously
been addressed to competition concerns, with restrictions
imposed only through exercise of the Commission’s authority
to review and block transactions on antitrust grounds. 122
This European Union initiative responds to calls for
creation of a CFIUS-like process at the E.U.-level in light of
growing concerns about Chinese investment—specifically,
that China has gained access to key technologies in Europe

119

See True Reciprocity Investment Act of 2017, S. 1722, 115th Cong.

(2017).
120 Proust, supra note 16; see also European Commission Press Release,
supra note 16.
121 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 63, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 71 (allowing for
free movement of capital); id. at art. 65 Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 72–
73 (providing public policy and public security justification for restrictions
on capital movements).
122 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document White Paper,
Towards More Effective EU Merger Control, at 18–22, SWD (2014) 221 final
(July
9,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_
merger_control/staff_working_document_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7VM2FEX].
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while shielding its own companies from foreign takeovers
through its own regulatory regime.123 On September 13, 2017,
the European Union set out a draft regulation proposing a
framework for screening foreign investments on the grounds
of “security or public order.”124 Like FIRRMA’s expansion of
“covered” transactions to include non-passive but noncontrolling acquisitions, the European Union proposal
includes an encompassing definition of foreign direct
investment, as deals involving a “foreign investor aiming to
establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the
foreign investor and the entrepreneur . . . including
investments which enable effective participation in the
management or control[.]”125 The European Parliament, the
European Council, and the Commission reached agreement on
the proposed screening framework in November 2018 126 and
anticipate approval of a final text in early 2019.
If adopted in its current form, the regulation would
empower the Commission to undertake review of any foreign
investment in an economic enterprise in a member state
where it “considers that a foreign direct investment is likely
to affect projects or programmes of [European] Union interest
on grounds of security or public order.”127 However, the
proposed regulation provides that while a member state is
required to take “utmost account” of the Commission’s
opinion, it need only “provide an explanation to the
123 See Gisela Grieger, Foreign Direct Investment Screening: A Debate
in Light of China-EU FDI Flows, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1, 4–5 (May 2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603941/EPRS_
BRI(2017)603941_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AK5-56Q4];
David
K.
Lakhdhir & Anna L. Christie, Paul Weiss Discusses Screening of Foreign
Investments in EU, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/10/06/paul-weiss-discussesscreening-of-foreign-investments-in-eu/ [https://perma.cc/XQ3V-SQHM].
124 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Establishing a Framework for Screening of Foreign Direct
Investments into the European Union, art. 1, COM (2017) 487 final (Sept.
13, 2017) [hereinafter Proposal for Screening].
125 Id. at art. 2.
126 See European Commission Press Release, supra note 16.
127 Proposal for Screening, supra note 124, at art. 9.
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Commission in case its opinion is not followed.” 128 The
proposal would not require member states to adopt a
screening mechanism for foreign investments; rather, it would
create an enabling framework and a set of basic principles for
member states that seek to establish such a mechanism. In
addition, the proposal would create a cooperation mechanism
whereby member states undertaking a review of a transaction
would be required to notify the Commission and the other
member states of such a review within five working days of its
initiation.129
Some individual European Union member states have
already implemented their own national security screening
mechanisms, among them Germany, France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom.130 These regimes vary in form and
stringency.131 The French regime allows the government to
block foreign takeovers of French companies in strategic
industries.132 A 2014 decree expanded the list of sectors in
which foreign investors must seek prior French government
authorization to include energy, transportation, and telecom,
among others, and extended the list of circumstances in which
a transaction may be blocked. 133 Germany, which already
permitted review of foreign takeovers for public order and
security concerns, enhanced its regime in 2017. 134 Through
the reform, Germany became the first European Union
member state to specifically screen transactions that threaten
critical infrastructure. The reform also increased notification
Id.
Id. at art. 8.
130 See Gisela Grieger, supra note 123, at 6 tbl.1 (showing securityrelated screening procedures for FDI at various member states); Wehrlé &
Pohl, supra note 13, annex 1 (describing screening practices for seventeen
countries, including Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom).
131 See Wehrlé & Pohl, supra note 13, annex 1. China also has a
screening regime for foreign investment, featuring a “negative list” of offlimits sectors and provisions defining national security in extremely broad
terms. Id.
132 Lakhdhir & Christie, supra note 123.
133 Id.
134 Id.
128
129
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requirements and extended review periods. 135 The United
Kingdom’s review process has historically been more limited,
although national security has been invoked seven times to
permit the government to intervene in foreign investments. 136
In March 2018, the United Kingdom government lowered the
threshold for its review of mergers that raise national security
concerns, broadening its review to include “dual use” military
items, computer hardware, and quantum technology.137 This
action is the first step to emerge from a consultative process
launched in October 2017, which had raised the possibility of
a mandatory notification regime, under which any foreign
investor in any one of several specified sectors would need to
obtain United Kingdom government approval before a
transaction would receive legal effect.138

C. Evaluation
Enhancing the existing national regimes in the ways
recently done in the United States and currently under
consideration elsewhere is sound policy. On balance and
subject to a variety of concerns ranging from lack of
transparency to under-inclusiveness, the CFIUS process
appears to have worked reasonably well in striking a balance
between maintaining openness to foreign investment while
screening out transactions that pose a risk to national
security. Broadening the scope of CFIUS review, mandating
review of certain transactions, and fostering information
sharing with other governments are sensible ways to enhance
the regime’s functional efficacy.
However, these reforms do not adequately address the
threats posed to the global cross-border M&A regime by a
NSB. As the brief review in this Section demonstrates, the

135
136

Id.
Id.
See DEP’T

137
FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, ENTERPRISE ACT
2002: CHANGES TO THE TURNOVER AND SHARE OF SUPPLY TESTS FOR MERGERS
5, 13 (Jun. 2018) (UK).
138 See DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT REVIEW 7, 47 (Oct. 2017) (UK).
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global response to concerns about the NSB has to date been
national in scope, and the intensity and contours of the review
processes vary significantly by country. The fact that many of
the existing national regimes are currently being re-examined
for possible enhancement suggests the weakness of the
current approaches in the face of China’s emergence as a
distinctive type of acquisitive actor in global M&A. The
pending European Union proposal, if adopted, would
constitute the first multi-country, coordinated approach to
national security screening. But as noted, it would not require
the creation of a uniform screening process at the memberstate level, and the Commission’s opinions as to specific
transactions would not be binding on member states.
Moreover, recent developments suggest inherent
limitations in the use of national security screening
mechanisms in response to concerns about the motives of
Chinese acquirers. For example, the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) voted in February of 2018
to block a proposed acquisition of the Chicago Stock Exchange
by a Chinese acquirer, even though the deal had been cleared
by CFIUS in 2016. 139 According to media reports, the SEC
rejected the deal because it “left too many unanswered
questions about who would ultimately have control over big
decisions at the exchange.” 140 The SEC indicated that it did
not consider the national security implications of the deal or
possible links between the buyer and the Chinese
government, because the proposed structure itself was
problematic.141 A second recent illustration of the limitations
of the CFIUS process is the Chinese government’s takeover of
Anbang Insurance Group (“Anbang”). Anbang is a private
company that engaged in a debt-fueled spate of overseas
acquisitions in recent years, including the purchase of the

139 Emily Flitter, S.E.C. Blocks Chinese Takeover of Chicago Stock
Exchange, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
02/15/business/china-deal-chicago-exchange-blocked.html
[https://perma.cc/W84J-X6E6].
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.142 The Chinese
government, increasingly concerned about the amount of debt
being amassed in the corporate sector, took over Anbang in
February 2018.143 The case raises an additional risk
associated with overseas Chinese acquisitions: that a
domestic target acquired by a private Chinese buyer in a
transaction cleared by CFIUS or another country’s national
security screening regime may ultimately wind up under the
control of the Chinese government.144
Similarly, the rejection of the Broadcom-Qualcomm
transaction,145 shows the distortion that may emerge in the
effort to package all concerns about the strategic objectives of
state-guided foreign actors in a national security box. In
stating CFIUS’s national security reasons for rejecting the
proposed acquisition (which had no direct link to China), the
United States Treasury was essentially forced to declare a
national
industrial
policy
of
developing
a
5G
telecommunications network and a national corporate
governance policy of disfavoring a debt-financed acquisition
relative to a stock-for-stock deal because of the possible effect
on long-term investment.146 In other words, China’s shadow
as an NSB loomed over a deal that involved no Chinese
participants, causing a contortion of the CFIUS process. In
most cases, the governmental concern will be that an
acquisition by an NSB will be in service of a foreign state’s
objectives, which may be hard to decipher: Is the state
pursuing mercantilist goals for competitive advancement of
NSB-home country firms? Or is there a geo-strategic motive
in play? These types of concerns are sources of instability in a
cross-border regime that features NSBs.

142 Alexandra Stevenson, After Anbang Takeover, China’s Deal Money,
Already Ebbing, Could Slow Further, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/business/china-deals-anbangtakeover.html [https://perma.cc/A3KY-8MPD].
143 Id.
144 See id.
145 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
146 See Mir, supra note 108.
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As noted in Part I, there is a contrast between
international trade and cross-border M&A. International
trade is governed, imperfectly to be sure, by a multilateral
regime of standard setting and dispute resolution. By
contrast, cross-border M&A—another important source of
global economic activity, equally, if not more sensitive to
national interests than international trade—is regulated
almost exclusively at the national level.147 A global economic
regime facing a problem of global dimensions calls for a global
solution. We are not naïve about the prospects for a global
regime of reciprocity in cross-border M&A. As described
below, the failure of the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers in
the European Union demonstrates the difficulty of crafting a
truly comprehensive approach. Rather, in the Part that
follows, we propose an alternative solution to the problem of
the NSB. Building on an existing set of principles on
investment policy agreed to by the G20 in 2016, we outline a
limited, but coordinated approach to cross-border M&A that
would mitigate concerns over asymmetric motives.

V. TOWARD A MULTILATERAL REGIME FOR
CROSS-BORDER M&A
Part V begins by acknowledging the challenges in
constructing any multilateral regime that would constrain
states’ efforts to use cross-border M&A for strategic purposes.
A first-best solution would be a regime that was self-enforcing,
in which the actors’ internalized motives would constrain
efforts by states to push for state-focused strategic objectives.
One straightforward approach is an eligibility regime of
“mutual contestability” under which a firm would be eligible
to undertake an acquisition of a foreign target only if the
would-be acquirer were itself susceptible to takeover by a
bidder domiciled outside its home country. Over time, a
regime of mutual contestability could be expected to eliminate
147 Almost, but not entirely, exclusively because the E.U. Takeover
Directive does attempt to coordinate basic principles for the regulation of
M&A among member states. But the Takeover Directive is a pale reflection
of a truly coordinated multilateral approach to cross-border M&A.
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the problem of the NSB. Assuming relatively efficient capital
markets, if an SOE (with a public float) or a governmentinfluenced POE were to adopt a “national” strategy that does
not maximize shareholder value, the firm would be
susceptible to takeover by acquirers with purely financial
motives because the stock price would reflect the cost to
shareholders of pursuing the national-welfare-maximizing
strategy. A financially motivated buyer could purchase the
SOE or government-influenced POE at a discount, eliminate
the costs incurred due to policy channeling,148 and benefit
from the increase in stock price. Over time, the capital and
control markets would eliminate NSBs. A regime of mutual
contestability would also eliminate complaints about the lack
of reciprocity that exacerbate frictions over Chinese foreign
investment.
The European Union’s experience with its Takeover
Directive demonstrates the challenges that a mutual
contestability proposal would face on a global level. 149 In 2001,
in the effort to resolve a longstanding deadlock over adoption
of the Takeover Directive, the European Commission
convened a High Level Group of Company Law Experts.150
Seeking to overcome national barriers to cross-border
acquisitions in order to facilitate growth of a “single market”
while assuring a “level playing field,” the expert group
proposed a mandatory board neutrality rule and a
“breakthrough” rule.151 The breakthrough rule would permit
See supra Section III.A.1.
See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L142) 12.
150 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The International Relations Wedge in the
Corporate Convergence Debate, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 161, 202 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds.,
2004).
151 See Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie van de Walle
de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? 1–3 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 141/2010, 2010); see also THE
HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, A MODERN REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 1, 112, 128 (Nov. 4, 2002),
www.ecgi.org/publications/winter.htm
[https://perma.cc/4Y8E-DQ9Z];
Gordon, supra note 150, at 203.
148
149
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the holder of a majority or required supermajority (and in no
event more than seventy-five percent) of a company’s cash
flow rights to “break-through” takeover impediments such as
dual class common stock or super-majority voting
requirements.152 The member states resisted these mutual
contestability provisions on local efficiency grounds—the
value of dual class common structures, common in
Scandinavia, for example—as well as arguments that were
more directly protectionist.153 The further objection was that
the Directive’s provisions were under-inclusive: they did not
attack impediments such as pyramidal structures and left
limitations on member states’ “golden shares” to resolution by
the European Court of Justice.154 The final Directive
permitted states to choose whether to opt in to this (partial)
mutual contestability regime and further permitted states
and firms to resist bids from companies and jurisdictions that
had opted against mutual contestability. It is, therefore,
commonly regarded as not having advanced the cause of
greater economic integration in the “single market” through
cross-border M&A.155
A mutual contestability regime is a heavy lift because it
entails a general challenge to ownership and control
structures that may have deep roots and even efficiency
justifications. “Breakthrough” rules are particularly
ineffective where the controller has a majority stock
ownership position or exercises control through a complicated
group structure, both of which are common features of state
and private ownership of business enterprises in China. Thus,
this Article proposes a governance structure within the firm
and an administrative agent to examine and certify the
See Gordon, supra note 150, at 203–04.
For a subtle critique from Scandinavia, see Erik Berglöf & Mike
Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POL’Y 171 (2003).
154 Gordon, supra note 150, at 204 n.80.
155 See Wolfgang Drobetz & Peyman Momtaz, Corporate Governance
Convergence in the European M&A Market (Jan. 16, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2642487 [https://perma.cc/YY5FJB8C] (finding no increase in European Union cross-border M&A after
adoption of the Takeover Directive and a decline in hostile bids).
152
153
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private, non-state economic motives behind a proposed crossborder M&A. The proposed structure builds an enforcement
mechanism using internal governance features rather than
relying on self-enforcing capital market pressures. It is
designed to supplement and complement, rather than to
replace, national-level screening regimes.
The starting point for our proposal is a global commitment
to commercial or financial motivations for outbound
investments by firms subject to government ownership or
influence as a means of contributing to the stability of the
global M&A market. There is precedent for building a
coordinated investment regime from this starting point. The
Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds (“Santiago
Principles”) were adopted in 2008 in response to concerns—
not unlike those relating to Chinese outbound investments
currently—about the possibility that sovereign wealth fund
(“SWF”) investments are motivated by non-commercial
objectives.156
The Santiago Principles are a nonbinding statement of
generally accepted principles and practices that members of
an “international working group” of SWFs have implemented
or aspire to implement.157 They emphasize the “core principle”
that “investment decisions should aim to maximize riskadjusted financial returns . . . based on economic and financial
grounds.”158 Further, they call for transparency in the source
of funding and operational independence of the SWF from the
government owner.159 These principles—financially-oriented
investment
decisions,
funding
transparency,
and
independence from the government in its role as investor—
should also comprise the core principles of acquisitions in a
cross-border M&A regime.
156 See INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES”
(Oct.
2008)
[hereinafter
SANTIAGO
PRINCIPLES],
https://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples
_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9273-KBNQ].
157 See id. at 4–5.
158 Id. at 22.
159 See id. at 4–5.
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However, addressing concerns about national strategic
motives in the SWF realm is considerably less complex than
in the case of cross-border M&A. This is because SWF
investments are portfolio investments that do not implicate
changes in control of the target or the composition of its core
governance organs. A parsimonious solution to the problem of
asymmetric motives in SWF investments is readily available:
the voting rights of equity acquired by a foreign-governmentcontrolled portfolio investor could be suspended (or voted in
proportion to the votes of non-SWF shareholders) until the
shares are sold to a non-government-affiliated investor.160
The Santiago Principles do not adopt this approach, instead
emphasizing the importance of ex ante disclosure of whether
and how SWFs plan to vote in order to “dispel concerns about
potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives.”161 Voting
suspension is obviously an untenable proposition in an
acquisition of control or of any significant stake by a buyer
seeking to influence the target. Ex ante disclosure of financial
motives is useful, but it is not credible as a signaling device
because governments can (and often do) say one thing but do
another. Thus, a commitment to financial investment motives
is only a starting point, but one that could readily be added to
the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment
Policymaking, adopted in 2016 when China held the
presidency of the G20.162 Borrowing from the Santiago
Principles, the multilateral regime should contemplate the
creation of a standing group of peer-monitoring and
information-sharing to evaluate on-going compliance.

160 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds
and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008).
161 SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 156, at 23.
162 G20 Guiding Principles, supra note 19. These are non-binding
principles whose objectives are to foster an open and transparent
environment for investment, to promote “coherence in national and
international investment policymaking,” and to encourage sustainable
development. Id. at 1. As such, a commitment to financially oriented
investment, funding transparency, and independence from the government
is highly consistent with the G20 Guiding Principles.
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As an alternative to a G20 engagement, the cross-border
eligibility regime could be fashioned under the auspices of
OECD, an organization of thirty-five developed countries that
also works with emerging economies like China. The OECD
could organize a consultative process, the end point of which
should be: first, articulating a commitment to own-firm
financial, commercial objectives in outbound M&A, not at the
behest of a government; second, crafting an “eligibility
regime” to monitor adherence to this commitment for firms
where government involvement raises difficult verification
questions; and third, establishing a secretariat that would
evaluate initial and continuing compliance with the eligibility
regime. This set-up would not require governments to agree
to forgo state ownership or policy channeling, but would
rather allow firms that engage in cross-border M&A to opt into
a regime designed to assure that outbound acquisitions
adhere exclusively to own-firm financial, commercial
objectives.
The eligibility regime would be triggered for any firm
whose governance is subject to intervention by a political
party or government, through (a) state ownership of the firm’s
equity, (b) mandatory representation by members of a
political party or government in the corporation’s governance
organs such as its board of directors or other committees, or
(c) a government-held golden share or equivalent veto rights
over major corporate decisions. 163 Importantly, this eligibility
regime would be a threshold set of requirements that must be
met before a firm can make a cross-border acquisition. It is
emphatically not a blanket prohibition against cross-border
acquisitions by all SOEs. The eligibility criteria are designed
to make it possible for an acquirer to make a credible
commitment that its cross-border acquisition proposal is
163 The secretariat would also have to be vested with a certain amount
of discretion to trigger the eligibility regime where a firm does not meet any
of the formal triggers but nonetheless appears susceptible to government
influence in its cross-border M&A activity. Factors that might be considered
in the exercise of this discretion could include the amount of government
contracts and government-linked financing the firm receives and the
backgrounds of its principal investors and top managers.
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motivated by private commercial objectives rather than
national strategic objectives.
A firm subject to the eligibility regime would be eligible to
engage in cross-border M&A if it met the following
requirements:
(i) the company commits in its charter or other
constitutive documents to undertake foreign
acquisitions solely for own-firm financial or
commercial objectives and not at the behest of any
government;
(ii) a significant portion, twenty-five percent, of the
company’s cash flow rights are available for purchase
by foreign shareholders;
(iii) the company’s governance structure provides for
independent directors comprising at least twenty-five
percent of the board (but not fewer than two) who will
be nominated by foreign shareholders;
(iv) in advance of a public acquisition proposal, the
independent directors are required under the
acquirer’s governance documents to prepare a report
for subsequent public release that attests to the ownfirm financial or commercial motivation and absence
of government involvement in the acquisition
decision; and
(v) the company provides full disclosure of the sources
of funding for the transaction before the transaction is
final.

A few clarifications are in order. First, we envision a
twenty-five percent free float requirement, with the free float
available for purchase by foreign or domestic investors, as a
weak form of mutual contestability. Foreign investors would
not necessarily have to own twenty-five percent of the shares.
Rather, the substantial free float would effectively serve as a
signal of openness by the firm to investment by a significant
block of shareholders not affiliated with the relevant
government. Second, our proposal vests authority to nominate
the independent directors with the foreign investors on the
theory that (a) these investors are likely to be sophisticated
institutional investors, such as BlackRock, and (b) the
reputational and other interests of such investors will cause
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them to be objective in their analysis of the commercial,
financial aims of a proposed transaction rather than simply
backing management and the foreign government in favor of
the acquisition. Third, a firm’s consideration of general
licensure, tax, and other incentive-shaping schemes
commonly employed by governments would not necessarily
mean that an acquisition was at the government’s “behest.”
The question would be the tightness of fit between the
governmental scheme, the national strategic objective, and
the specific action of the firm. Of course, in any particular
case, the question may be a close one.
Enforcement of the regime would consist of two elements:
first, a secretariat that can evaluate whether a would-be
acquirer satisfies the eligibility criteria both as a general
matter in its governance set-up and as to the specific
transaction; and second, national legislation that would
permit rejection of a local target’s acquisition by an acquirer
that does not meet the eligibility criteria.
These eligibility criteria are chosen to reinforce one
another. The availability of a twenty-five percent foreign float
provides an opening for institutional investors, who have a
major stake in preserving a flexible cross-border M&A regime
because of the value thereby created. These minority
shareholders are empowered to nominate—effectively to
select—at least two independent directors. The independent
directors have special fiduciary duties to assess the firm’s
acquisition objectives and to verify both the commercial,
financial motivation and the absence of government
involvement in the particular acquisition decision. The
acquirer is also separately obligated to disclose its funding
sources for the acquisition, which should provide another
occasion for critical scrutiny of a possible hidden
governmental hand.
Compliance with the eligibility regime could be woven into
national cross-border merger review schemes through local
law. In addition to specific national security concerns, a
country could: (i) debar an acquirer that fails the eligibility
criteria, (ii) reject specific transactions that fail the
verification scheme, or (iii) debar an acquirer that initially
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satisfied or appeared to satisfy the eligibility regime with
respect to a transaction where facts emerge that indicate
otherwise. The eligibility regime gains its force from its
consequences in the national review process.

VI. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
There are several possible objections to our proposal that
merit response. The first is a general “welfarist” objection:
what is the actual concern raised by a national strategic
buyer? Target shareholders get higher prices and more
investment flows into favored sectors, which should spur more
innovation and risk-taking (much like the flood of venture
capital finance). There is both a private and public answer.
NSBs have a competitive advantage over conventional
acquirers because of their access to lower-cost state finance
and the implicit promise of state support if the acquisition is
not successful in income statement terms. In other words,
NSBs face soft budget constraints rather than hard budget
constraints on acquisitive activity and deal pricing. NSB
activity in the United States and the European Union could
thus lead to distorted prices that adversely affect resource
allocation in important sectors. Moreover, conventional
acquirers could be deprived of access to competitively valuable
technology or other resources, which would hamper their
growth.
The more serious concerns are public. In critical sectors
like technology, the goal of national policy is to create
“agglomeration economies,” that is, concentrations of
expertise that build on one another for durable growth and
innovation.164 There is a geographical component, reflected in
an “industrial district” like Silicon Valley,165 but also a
harder-to-specify human network that supplies energy and

See generally Glaeser, supra note 11.
See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996); Ronald J.
Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575 (1999).
164
165
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cross-fertilizing ingenuity. A critical feature of United States
industrial policy is to foster such developments through
private finance and open capital markets. The concern is that
the NSB, applying a more directive industrial policy, could
capture key inputs and channel them to NSB-home country
advantage. More specifically, the concern is that Chinese
NSBs could pursue such acquisitions on a scale that would
shift the location of innovation, and thus durable economic
growth, from the United States to China. 166
Whether these concerns are well-taken or merely scaremongering, large-scale NSB acquisitions are perceived by
other governments as threatening and as violations of the
existing order in cross-border M&A. Target-home-country
protectionism is grudgingly accepted as part of the M&A
game, as the European Union experience demonstrates, but
acquirer-home-state aid or direction is a violation; it is the
difference between offense and defense in state action. Our
view is that NSB activity has injected instability into the
cross-border M&A regime. As the developing pattern of
United States, United Kingdom, and European Union
responses demonstrate, Chinese NSB acquisitions could
trigger a reaction that may radically transform the crossborder M&A regime.
The vetoed Broadcom-Qualcomm matter demonstrates
this possibility. 167 There was no threat to United States
national security interests as conventionally understood.
Indeed, except for its (temporary) Singaporean domicile,
Broadcom was a thoroughly “American” firm, if we look to
ownership by United States institutions and asset managers
or the nationality of directors and senior managers. The
Trump administration decided that Broadcom’s acquisition of
166 See
Enrico Moretti, The Local and Aggregate Effect of
Agglomeration on Innovation: Evidence from High Tech Clusters (Working
Paper,
2018),
https://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/clusters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WNL8-9U8U] (finding that the demise of Kodak was
followed by an 11.2% productivity decline of non-Kodak inventors, as
measured by patent data, and that a scientist’s move to a larger technology
cluster leads to notable increases in such productivity).
167 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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Qualcomm would undercut R&D investment in a
telecommunications innovation, 5G, also pursued by Chinese
rivals: “[A] shift to Chinese dominance in 5G would have
substantial negative national security consequences for the
United States.”168 The same objection could have been raised
in the case of a United Kingdom or Swiss acquirer. Under the
cover of Chinese NSB activity in the technology space, the
United States government has opened the door to a national
industrial policy screen for all cross-border M&A. Thus, it will
be in the interests of all long-term players in the cross-border
M&A market—all institutional investors, asset managers,
sovereign wealth funds, and intermediaries—to work together
to fashion a regime that will visibly constrain the pursuit of
national strategic objectives by cross-country acquirers,
especially China. This is what our eligibility regime aims to
do.
What is novel in the eligibility regime is the use of a
corporate governance strategy to solve a problem of
international relations. Over the past forty years, private and
governmental actors have increasingly looked to the board of
directors to address difficult regulatory matters and have
enhanced the demands for director independence and
engagement. Perhaps the most successful uses have been in
the control of accounting fraud and in the sale of the firm. The
Sarbanes-Oxley regime—which includes audit committee
oversight of outside accounting experts—helped ensure there
was no significant accounting fraud among large financial
players during the 2008 Financial Crisis, despite the
enormous financial stress and the incentives for book-

168

Mir, supra note 108.
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cooking.169 The special committee process allows the
independent directors to marshal significant outside expertise
to evaluate competing bids for the target and can produce the
simulacrum of arm’s length bargaining even in conflict cases.
These examples lead us to the belief that an eligibility regime
employing
independent
director
investigation
and
certification can credibly evaluate an acquirer’s motives for a
transaction.
The final issue is whether China in particular would
subject its firms to an “eligibility regime” for cross-border
M&A. The proposal would not require China to give up its
pattern of state ownership or state-guided industrial policy,
but it would limit China’s ability to use cross-border M&A as
a mechanism for the pursuit of state strategy. The proposal
would not require China to accede to an international
agreement, but merely to acquiescence to the willingness of
SOEs and POEs to submit to the eligibility regime, which
would not affect the ownership and governance of those firms.
Obviously, such a regime would not be the first choice of
Chinese leadership. But to emphasize what we wrote earlier:
without some type of intervention along the lines we suggest,
the present cross-border M&A regime may unravel. President
Xi has spoken forcefully in favor of openness in trade and
investment, emphasizing that “[t]o grow its economy, China
must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global
market.”170 Support for a multilateral regime that constrains
mercantilist, national-strategic motivations for deals would
169 There is some evidence that Lehman Brothers engaged in
aggressive accounting to dress up quarterly reports to divert attention from
its highly leveraged balance sheet. See Report of Examiner Anton R.
Valukas at 962, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., 422 B.R. 407
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), (discussing Repo 105 transactions).
But significant accounting fraud in large banks and investment banks was
not among the crisis causes explored in depth by, e.g., the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf [perma.cc/E7EZ-LE6A].
170 Xi, supra note 26.
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demonstrate China’s commitment to sound governance of the
global market for cross-border M&A.

VII.CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted a problem in the cross-border
M&A regime, the national strategic buyer, whose motives for
engaging in an acquisition violate an implicit assumption
upon which this global market operates: that both selling
shareholders and foreign acquirers act in pursuit of
commercial and financial, rather than industrial policy,
objectives. It has offered a proposed multilateral response to
this problem drawn from corporate governance best practices
that operationalizes principles of international investment
already agreed to by the G20.
Reasonable people may disagree about the workability of
our proposal, and we welcome a debate about alternative
approaches. However, given the current depth and scope of
concern over Chinese acquisitions in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere, it is prudent to consider ways in which
the operation of this important global market can be adjusted
to take account of China’s emergence as a major player. We
believe that a multilateral approach is preferable to continued
tightening of national security screening regimes at the
national level. At a minimum, we hope to have demonstrated
that the current bilateral, transactional approach to inboundinvestment screening on the basis of national security is not
the only, or necessarily the best, way to alleviate concerns over
the NSB.

